Kelley v. Yadon Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 36705 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-10-2010
Kelley v. Yadon Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36705
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Kelley v. Yadon Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36705" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2440.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2440
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GEORGE KELLEY and JOANN 
KELLEY, husband and wife, 
KIM YADON, 
WARREN YADON, 













RESPONDENTS' KELLEYS BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
in and for Cassia County, Honorable Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge, presiding. 
William A. Parsons 
Parsons, Smith and Stone, LLP 
137 W. 1 3 ' ~  Street 
Box 910 
Burley, ID 83318 
Attorneys for Respondents, Kelleys 
Steven A. Tuft 
Tuft Law Office 
191 8 Overland Avenue 
Box 759 
Burley, ID 833 18 
Attorney for Respondent, Kiln Yadoli 
Sam L. Angell 
Nelson, Hall, Pany Tucker, P.A. 
490 Memorial Drive 
Box 51630 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1630 
Attorneys for Appellant, Warren Yadoli 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Exceptions 
Additions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Summary Judgment. 
Trial Court Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUE & FINDINGS AND 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  CONCLUSIONS ISSUE 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3. THE RESULTING TRUST ISSUE 
4. THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ISSUE. . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5. THE EVICTION ISSUE 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6. THE ATTORNEY FEE ISSUES 
7. PURCI-IASE PRICE ISSUE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Payment of Purchase Price 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Absolute Obligation to Pay. 
. . . . . . . .  CONCLUSION 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 
106 ldaho 188,677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1984) 
Bluestone v. Mathewson, 
103 ldaho 453,649 P.2d 1209 (1982) 
Crowley v. CritchJield, 
145 Idaho 509, 181 P.3d 435 (2007) 
Estate ofHall v. Williams, 
126 Idaho 437,885 P.2d 1153 (Ct. App. 1994) 
Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 
126 Idaho 467,886 P.2d 772 (1994) 
Lepel v. Lepel, 
93 Idaho 82,456 P.2d 249 (1969) 
Sherman v. Watts, 
80 Idaho 44,324 P.2d 380 (1958) 
Shurrum v. Watts, 
80 Idaho 44,324 P.2d 380 (1958) 
Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V.,  
148 Idaho 89,218 P.3d 1150 (2009) 
Wilson v. DeBoard 










4, 5 ,6 ,7  
5 
STATUTES, RULES AND PROCEDURES 
I.A.R. I 1  
Idaho Code $6-303 
I. R. C. P. 56(c) 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 5 404 (1959) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
George ICelley and JoAnn Kelley herein ("Kelleys") concur generally with the Statement of 
the Case in the Warren Yadon Brief with the following clarifications and additions. 
Warren Yadon uses the term "purchased" when referring to the acquisition of the 
Montgomery Place. What is left out is that all of the purchase price was paid from loan proceeds 
obtained by Warren and Kim Yadon and which loans have been paid back by refinancing or 
payments currently being made by Kelleys. There were basically two loans, Farm Credit and a 
refinance with D. L. Evans Bank and assigned to RABO for which the payments are being made by 
Kelleys. 
In addition, the Statement of Facts ignores the agreement between Kelleys and Warren and 
Kiln Yadon that the Montgomery Place would be conveyed to Kelleys when the payment of the loan 
was finally paid. 
Liltewise missing is reference to the improvement made to the Montgomery Place by Kelleys 
as well as payment of the real estate taxes, the con~pliance with IDWR water issues and the use of 
Kelleys' equipment as part security for the loans. 
All of the foregoing summaries of omissions are iinportant that support the Resulting Trust 
decisions by the Trial Court. 
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The only omissions from the Warren Yadon Brief are that the District Court dismissed the 
Counter-Claim of Warren Yadon for Slander of Title and Eviction. R. Vol. 2, pp. 400 and 409. The 
District Court awarded attorney fees to Kelleys. R. Vol. 2, p. 439. 
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts by Warren Yadon are generally correct with the following exceptions 
and additions: 
Exceptions: 
3.1 On page 6 of the Warren Yadon brief in the full second paragraph the phrase 
of "exchange" is used and this is a misstatement ofthe testimony which is from Tr. p. 158, LL. 4-20. 
A. It was my farm. 
Q. Well, okay. So the status as we have it in 1994 after this last warranty deed 
from Doc Flanders is Warren and Kim Yadon were the only two legal owners 
of the property, and you had proposed to continue to run the farm, pay the 
payments and pay the expenses, and that's how you were operating? Just to 
be clear, that's how it was going; right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And your claim today, as I understand it, is that you own the f m ,  you 
keep saying that, because you've paid all the payments along the way; right? 
A. That was the agreement. 
Q. Oltay. Now, did you really make all the payments? 
A. Yes. 
3.2 The use of the term "profit" is a misstatement as the testimony on Tr. pp. 157- 
158 is that Kelleys would pay all expenses and keep all the money and malte the payments. 
Additions: 
3.3 ICelleys paid all paymcnts to Farm Credit, the original loan. Tr. p. 96, LL. 21- 
23. All payments on RARO have been paid by Kelleys. Tr. p. 100, LL. 11-13 and Exhibit 35. 
3.4 Family relationship. Tr. pp. 77-79. 
3.5 Kelleys' cquipinent was used as partial security for loan. Tr. p. 95, LL. 1-25, 
pp. 43 1-432, LL. 1-25, 1-1 6. 
3.6 All payments made by Yadons were reimbursed. Tr. p. 100, LL. 14-17. 
3.7 Kelleys made improvements over the years. Tr. pp. 107-108, LL. 1-25 and 1-7. 
3.8 Water rights perfected by Kelleys. Tr. pp. 112,113 and 114, LL. 1-25,l-25 
and 1-12. 
3.9 Kelleys paid all taxes. Tr. pp. 116 and 117, LL. 4-25 and 1-9. 
3.10 Kelleys paid for Planning and Zoning Permit. Tr. p. 118, LL. 3-14. 
3.11 Why the Montgomery Place was in the name of Warren Yadon and Kim 
Yadon. Tr. pp. 203-208. All pages of Todd Phillips' testimony which also appears throughout the 
testimony of George ICelly, Kim Yadon and Kitty ICelley. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Kelleys submit that there is an additional issue on appeal and that is Kelleys are entitled to 
attorney fees on the Appeal because the Appeal is brought without foundation and the Appeal merely 
invites the Appellate Court to second guess the Trial Court and does not involve any legal issues that 
have not been established under the facts. 
ARGUMENT 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summarv Judgment: 
Yadon asserts that the Trial Court erred in not granting him Summary Judgment. 
Vreeken v. LockwoodEngineering, B. V.,  148 Idaho 89,218 P.3d 1150 (2009) states clearly the long- 
standing rule of this court when it stated: 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the 
same standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for 
summary judgment Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307,160 
P.3d 743,746 (2007). Summary judgment is proper "ifthe pleadings, depositions, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." LR. C. P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to 
show that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Caferty v. Dep 't ofTransp., 
Div. OfMotor Vehicle Servs., 144 Idaho 324, 327. 160 P.3d 763, 766 (2007). "If 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over which 
this Court exercises free review." Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P. 3dal746 (quoting 
Znfanger v. City ofSaImon, 137 Idaho 45,47,44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002))." 
I-faving set out the standard because Warren Yadon placed emphasis on it, it is the 
rnle in Idaho that the denial of the Summary Judgment Motion is not appealable under 1A.R. 1 I and 
the holdings in Wilson v. DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562,494 P.2d 566 (1 972) and Bluestone v. Mathewson, 
103 Idaho 453, 649 P.2d 1209 (1982). It was Judge Crabtree that denied the Motion and therefore 
the Appeal on that issue should he denied 
Trial Court Findings: 
fieelcen, supra, also held as to the long-standing appellate standard on a court trial when the 
holding was: 
"When reviewing a trial court's conclusions following a bench trial, our 
review is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, 
and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. Borah v. McCandless, 147 
Idaho 73, ----, 205 P.3d 1209,1213 (2009). "Since it is the province of the trial court 
to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses, 
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the 
judgment entered." Id. These findings of fact will not be set aside unless the trial 
court's findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. TopazMtg., L.P., 143 ldaho 641, 
643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). "If the trial court based its findings on substantial 
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn those 
findings on appeal." Borah, I47 Idaho at ----, 205 P.3du11213. Furthermore, this 
Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 
Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4. However, we exercise free review over matters of law. 
Borah, 147 Idaho at 73,205 P.3d at 1213." 
2. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUE & FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ISSUE 
Warren Yadon argues that the Trial Court erred in not granting his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. I.K. C. P. 56(c) provides that basis of granting the Motion, but only if there are no genuine 
issues of fact. Judge Crabtree carefully reviewed the pleadings, portions of depositions on file and 
affidavits, and found certain facts not in dispute aid also certain facts that were in dispute which 
were: (1) whether there was an Agreement to Reconvey the farm when debt was paid; and (2) 
whether there was a Lease. Judge Crabtree then went further in his Decision to apply the undisputed 
facts to the law on Resulting Trust and concluded that he needed to hear the evidence and judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The Trial Court then further held that the disputed facts on how Warren 
and Kim Yadon acquired the farm required a trial to hear all the evidence and judge the credibility of 
the witnesses. R. pp. 245-1 51. As stated above the Order Denying the Summary Judgment was not 
appealable in any event. 
The review of the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions is governed by the holding of 
Vreeken, supra, where the review by this court is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence 
supports the findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. It will be 
evident from this Brief, as well as a complete review of the Decision, along with the transcript, that it 
is clear that the evidence supports the findings and the findings support the conclusions of law. To 
reverse the Trial Court would be merely second guessing the Trial Court based on the record in this 
case which is overwhelming in favor of affirming the Judgment. 
3. THE RESULTING TRUST ISSUE 
The argument is made that the Trial Court misapplied the elements of a Resulting Trust 
regarding the payment of the purchase price by KeIIeys and that they had not established the 
elements by clear and convincing evidence. 
Both Resulting Trust and Constructive Trusts are not new theories of the law. They are often 
used without distinction. A party in the position of Kelleys, under the facts, certainly would be 
remiss if both were not plead prior to the facts being fully developed. Both theories have a common 
denominator of unjust enrichment. The evidence may have led the court to the conclusion in the 
Constructive Trust theory that the property was obtained by Warren and Kim Yadon by "any other 
unconscientious manner" as was stated in Beagoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188,677 P.2d 501 
(Ct. App. 1984). 
However the court, based on the evidence, properly found that the Resultiilg Trust was the 
proper relief. To overturn that ruling would again be contrary to the holding in Vreekea, supra. It 
would place this court in second guessing Judge Crabtree. 
In Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44,324 P.2d 380 (1958) the Idaho Supreme Court defined a 
Resulting Trust in the following statements: 
1. Where title to property is taken in the name of one party, but the consideration is paid 
by another, a Resulting Trust arises in favor of the party who pays the consideration. 
2. As a general rule, a Resulting Trust arises only where such may reasoilably be 
presumed to be the intention of the parties as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at 
the time of the transaction. 
3. The beneficiary claiming the protection of a Resulting Trust must have paid 
incurred an absolute obligation to pay, the consideration for the conveyance. (Emphasis supplied). 
In the Shurrum case the court required that the beneficiary prove the Resulting Trust by clear, 
cogent, and.convincing evidence of the underlying facts. 
In the Estate ofHall v. Williams, 126 Idaho 437,885 P.2d 1153 (Ct. App. 1994) the Idaho 
Court of Appeals said: 
"A Resulting Trust arises by implication of law rather than by contract or expression 
of the Trustor. Hawe v. Hawe, 89 Idaho 367,406 P.2d 106 and Shepard v. Dougan, 
58 Idaho 543,76 P.2d 442 (1937). 
A Resulting Trnst arises where aperson makes or causes to be made a disposition of 
property under circumstances which raise an inference that he does not intend the 
person talting or holding the property should have the beneficial interest therein 
unless the inference is rebutted or the beneficial interest is otherwise effectively 
disposed of." 
Citing also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 5 404 (1959) and also Bengoechea v. 
Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188,677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1984). 
In Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467,886 P.2d 772 (1994) the Idaho Supreme Court said: 
"Idaho law presumes that the holder of title to property is the legal owner of the 
property." (Citations Omitted) The Idaho Statute of Frauds requires that all interest 
in real property must be accomplished through a writing, signed by the party granting 
the interest or that parties agent. Although a trust in real property can arise by 
implication or operation of law without such writing. (Idaho Code 3 9-504), aperson 
claiming ownership through such a trust must establish such claim by evidencc that is 
clear, satisfactory and convincing. (Citations Omitted) The determination of 
whether such evidence has been presented is a question of fact to be determined by 
the trial court, and the court's findings will be disturbed only if they are clearly 
erroneous." 
The Supreme Court further went on in the Hettinga case and said in order to establish 
existence of a Resulting Trust, Mr. Hettinga must prove that the Ilettingas and the Sybrandys 
intended for the Sybrandys to hold the property in Trust for the Hettingas and that the I-Iettingas 
either paid or incurred an absolute obligatioil to pay for the property. Citing Sherman v. Watts, 80 
Idaho 44,324 P.2d 380 (1958). (Emphasis Added). 
The evidence is clear, cogent and convincing that gives rise to a Resulting Trust in this case. 
At the outset the Kelleys had a Lease and Option to Purchase the Montgomery farm, however, 
because of solue misfortune the Kelleys arranged to have the Montgomery Place conveyed to the 
Yadons, by their Option to Purchase, through various transactions involving Commons and Flanders. 
Various documents in evidence demonstrate the chain of title as to how the property ended into the 
Yadons. 
The evidence produced by the Kelleys is clear, cogent and convincing that the intent was that 
Yadons would have only legal title and that Kelleys would retain the beneficial interest and this was 
further born out by the clear testimony oFCPA, Todd Phillips, who pointed out the arrangement that 
existed between the Kelleys and the Yadons as to the Montgomery Place. His testimony was 
fortified by the conduct of Kelleys in that they have made all of the payments of principal and 
interest on the Commons Contract, Flanders Contract, Northwest Farm Credit loan, and the D. L. 
Evans Bank loan that is now held by Rabo. ICelleys have paid all of the real estate taxes, paid for all 
of the improvements, either themselves or through entities of which they are principals, and had 
included in the D. L. Evans loan $93,000.00 for improvements of which is part of the principal being 
paid by the retirement of the loans. In addition they got the water certified in the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication. The development of the gravel pit certainly demonstrates that they intended to have 
the beneficial interest ofthe Montgomery Place. The payments to Commons and Flanders came out 
of the Farm Credit loan or the D. L. Evans loan, and both loans were or are being paid by Kelleys 
through the loan payments. 
By the very definition of a Resulting Trust, a Resulting Trust exists in this case from the time 
when Kelleys assigned their Option to Purchase the Montgomery Place to close family members. 
They did so by giving up option money paid, giving up the cost of improvements made on the place 
before the Option was assigned, and then continuing for almost 15 years of making all principal and 
interest payments, real estate taxes and paying for additional improvements. How could the 
inferences be any stronger that ICelleys did not intend the Yadons, holding bare-naked legal title to 
the property, should have the beneficial interest in the Montgomery Place. That inference is not 
rebutted by any credible evidence but the inference is, on the other hand, supported by the testimony 
and the documentary evidence introduced by ICelleys. 
The evidence offered in opposition to the unbiased testimony of Todd Phillips and the 
conduct of Kelleys, in addition to the Kelley testimony, was vague, without documentation and was 
speculative in nature. There was absolutely no positive evidence offered by Warren Yadon that 
abrogates the impositiol~ of a Resulting Trust on the Montgomery Place for the benefit of George and 
Jo Ann Kelley. Warren Yadon did not in any way rebut the facts other than to say the events didn't 
happen and why he should have the beneficial interest in the Montgomery Place. The evidence for 
the Kelleys is clear, cogent and convincing. 
4. THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ISSUE 
Kelleys were obligated to prove the trust by clear and convincing evidence. They did that 
through the testimony of George Kelley, Kitty Kelley, Kim Yadon and by an independent witness, 
Todd Phillips. Tr. pp. 199-214. The testimony of each of those witnesses coupled with the evidence 
of payment by ICelleys, the use of other assets to secure the loan weigh heavy. On the contrary the 
evidence of Warren Yadon was almost nonexistent. He either did not have records, did not 
remember or did not know the details, as he left the agreement to Kim Yadon in the beginning and 
throughout the term. By leaving the transaction to Kim Yadon certainly gives credit to her testimony 
as her testimony is of no benefit to her and is beneficial to her parents, which is against her interest. 
Part performance, coupled with the testimony, is as good as a written agreement and certainly 
Kelleys have exhibited performance to this point in time and all they have to do is complete the loan 
payments and title is theirs. On the other hand, if they do not complete the payments then they do 
not get title as beneficiary of the Resulting Trust. 
How much stronger could the evidence be? The Trial Court in its Decision went through 
each of the witnesses' testimony and pointed out where it supported the conclusion of a Resulting 
Trust. 
5. THE EVICTION ISSUE 
Eviction was not appropriate as there was no evidence of a leasehold interest except by 
conclusory statements without any supporting detail. In fact, Warren Yadon said: "There was no 
Lease." Tr. p. 402, L. 11. In addition, there is no testimony as to terms of the Lease such as to term 
and who carried the insurance, taxes, etc. The Trial Court was correct on its ruling as to no eviction. 
Additionally, the service of the eviction was not in compliance with the statute on unlawful detainer. 
Idaho Code $6-303. The Notice of Eviction, Exhibit D, said that Kelleys did not have a Lease and 
they were required to execute a new Lease or vacate the premises. The stated reason is not a legal 
basis by Idaho Code $6-303. Kim Yadon did not join in the eviction process claim. The Trial Court 
did not commit error in its ruling. 
6 .  THE ATTORNEY FEE ISSUES 
There are two attorney fee issues: (1) the claim by Warren Yadon for the Trial Court 
awarding Kelleys' fees, and (2) Kelleys' claim for fees on this Appeal. 
As to the first issue, the court property awarded fees because ICelleys were the prevailing 
party and because Warren Yadon did not object to the fees claimed by Kelleys. R. Vol. 2, pp. 439- 
440. Warren Yadon certainly cannot complain of an Order on fees when he did not object to them in 
any manner. 
As to the second issue, Kelleys are entitled to fees on this Appeal because the Appeal was 
brought without foundation or invites the Appellate Court to second guess the Trial Court on the 
weight of the evidence. Crowley v. Critck3eld, 145 Idaho 509,lS 1 P.3d 435 (2007). Both standards 
are present in this case. Especially on the second-guess standard because all the clear and convincing 
evidence supports the long recognized theory in Idaho of a Resulting Trust which was the ruling of 
thc Trial Court after hearing all the witnesses and considering the evidence. Ofparticular impotlance 
is the lack of evidence produced by Warren Yadon in opposition to the claims of the Kelleys. It is 
important to note the evidence of Warren Yadon when he testified that Todd Phillips, an unbiased 
witness, lied. Tr. p. 392, LC. 8-15. 
Q. Is he lying? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And Mr. Phillips is not telling the truth? 
A. Mr. Phillips is stating his opinion, which is not the truth. 
Q. And it's not the truth? 
A. Not in my opinion, sir, no. 
7. PURCHASE PRICE ISSUE 
Considerable argument is spent on the Resulting Trust issue as to "payment of the purchase 
price" and an "absolute obligation to pay." Warren Yadon relies on Hettinga v Sybrandy, I26 
Idaho 467, 886 P.2d 772 (1995). The requirements of Hettinga, supra, are present in this case and 
this case is distinguishable from Heuinga. 
Payment of Purchase Price: Argument is made that Warren Yadon and Kim Yadon paid the 
purchase price because of the loan proceeds were used to pay for the property in a couple of 
transactions, i.e., loans. It should be notcd that in ITettinga, supra, relied on the law that has been 
quoted previously in this Brief that the findings of the court will not be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous. It is argued that the loan was the payment ofthe purchase price. That is true at the outset, 
but who paid or is paying the payment on the loan? Kelleys are. Warren Yadon relies on Lepel v. 
Lepel, 93 Idaho 82,456 P.2d 249 (1969). Such reliance is misplaced because in Lepel the court said 
"no property belonging to the community of plaintiff and defendant was employed to purchase the 
house." The purchase price was paid by a loan that was secured by separate property and paid back 
by separate property, but the point is that no community funds were used to pay the loan that was for 
the purchase price. Exactly the same here, no community funds of Yadons were used to pay the loan 
as it has been and is being paid for by Kelleys. 
It is a stretch to say that the loan proceeds paid the purchase price. If that were the case the 
loan company would own the property. Every loan is contemplated to be paid baclc and that is the 
issue. If Yadons had paid the loan payments or paid off the loan then this case may have had a 
different outcome. But as stated, the Yadons did not put any money into the transaction for which 
they were not reimbursed. Additionally, the clear evidence is that it was never contemplated that 
Yadons were to make the payments. Judge Crabtree heard the witnesses and reviewed the evidence 
in that regard and found that there was no credible evidence to rebut it. 
Absolute Obligation to Pay: It is argued that Kelleys did not have the absolute obligation to 
pay because there was no writing. Obviously, Kelleys did have the obligation to pay or they would 
not get the property back. George Kelley testified. Tr. p. 93, LL. 1-8. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did - who made the payments on that loan? 
A. I did. 
Q. All of them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you pay them? 
A. That was the agreement for then1 financing the farm for me was I was to 
make the payments and pay the expenses. 
So, if Kelleys did not pay the loan they would not get the property back. What is more of an 
obligation? If they did not pay along the way, Yadons could certainly terminate the agreement. 
Kelleys certainly have performed to this point in time. There is no evidence in the record that they 
have not made all the payments or reimbursed Yadons for the few payments they may have made. 
This case is distinguishable from Hettinga, supra, because in this case there is corroborated 
testimony as to the intent of the agreement at the inception as opposcd to Hettinga, supra, where the 
testimony was uncorroborated as to intent. 
The argumellt is further made that the evidence is not clear and convincing that Kelleys paid 
the payment and reimbursed Yadons for the few they inay have paid and that the Trial Court 
somehow shifted the burden to Warren Yadon. The Trial Court did not shift the burden to Wmen 
Yadon but judged the evidence on what was prescnted. Warren Yadon apparently did not have any 
evidence to the contract of what Kim Yadon testified to as well as the Kelleys. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appeal should be dismissed because the Trial Court correctly applied the law of 
Resulting Trusts to the facts that were proved by clear and convincing evidence, properly dismissed 
the eviction claim because there was no Lease between Yadon and Kelleys, properly awarded 
attorney fees because Kelleys were the prevailing party and there was not any objection by Yadon to 
the cost bill that included attorney fees. 
Additionally, the court should award attorney fees to Kelleys for the reasons that the Appeal 
is without foundation on the Summary Judgment issue and only requests the Appellate Court to 
second-guess the Trial Court on factual issues as applied to the law. 
DATED this ;;j/ day of February 2010. 
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